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Unemployment Insurance and the Role of Retained Earnings from Part-Time Work
Chris Hocker
In this paper, I adapt the game-theoretical model of Zuckerman (1985) to include the
decision to take on a part-time job while receiving unemployment benefits. The optimal
stopping rule is defined, as is the rule for accepting part-time work while receiving
unemployment compensation. It is shown that an increase in the value of part-time work
actually decreases its appeal, due to the effects on reservation wages.

I. Introduction
!

The rationale for unemployment insurance is rather straightforward. One, it seeks

to smooth consumption for workers during times of economic stress. This, in turn,
encourages the worker to make a good job choice. Since its inception in 1935,
unemployment insurance has been the focus of scrutiny, with special interest in the
effects on social welfare and employment. Yoder (1931) preempted the implementation
of UI law with a discussion of the increased unemployment and reduced wages that
would accompany compulsory insurance. Rorty (1936) put it even more bluntly: “The
unfortunate situation, today, is that the average worker has been promised the rainbow
with a pot of gold at the end.” More recently, authors have sought to measure the
incentive effects of unemployment insurance and the return to full-time work.
!

One aspect of the unemployment insurance system that has not been analyzed

in detail has been the issue of part-time work. When an unemployed worker is receiving
unemployment benefits and searching for a job, he is allowed to take on a part-time job
in the meantime and still receive unemployment benefits. The idea of this wage

2

disregard is to encourage work. In the body of unemployment literature, there are only a
handful of notable examples of research on part-time work. Munts (1970) measured the
disincentive effects of a certain kind of disregard in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Nebraska
and suggested that in the face of extreme disincentives, workers will choose to cut back
on working part-time. McCall (1996) studied the effects of varying the size of the
disregard and Kyyra (2008) used Finnish data to estimate the likelihood of returning to a
full-time job given that the worker took on a part-time job during his search, and found
that partial unemployment associated with short-term jobs taken on during an
unemployment spell facilitate the transition back to full-time work. Gerfin and Lechner
(2002) find results similar to those of Kyyraʼs in a Swtizerland study.
!

One curious aspect of the American unemployment insurance system that is

addressed briefly in Munts but not McCall is the type of part-time wage disregard that
the government employs. Currently, in 39 states, this disregard is some fixed dollar
amount, and above that, additional hours worked at the part-time job will lead to a
dollar-for-dollar reduction in benefits. The remaining states and Washington, DC employ
a partial earnings disregard. In a partial retained earnings system, the unemployed
workerʼs unemployment compensation is reduced by a fraction of a dollar for every
dollar he earns at a part-time job. These two schemes are illustrated in Figure 1 . The
fact that states have been slowly adopting this partial disregard over time leads to the
obvious question of whether or not this system is any better at either encouraging return
to work or decreasing the costs of the system. This paper seeks to close that gap,
borrowing from the reservation wage model developed by Zuckerman (1985).
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!

The main issue comparing the effects of either system is that part-time work

detracts from searching for a full-time job and extends the benefit period. So
encouraging working part-time has the possible effect of delaying return to full-time
work. On the other hand, it is possible that increased part-time work has positive
benefits, such as a stronger commitment to the workforce and increased income. The
effect of allowing more job offers. Since the full retained earnings benefit scheme is flat
beyond the disregard, which represents no additional income for an additional hour of
work, there is the possibility that a worker chooses a sub-optimal part-time work
schedule, which may then increase the cost of the program, as suggested by Munts
(1970).
!

In this paper, we will compare changes in the unemployment benefit through

direct changes in the benefit, and through changes in the replacement rate r . It is found
that an increase in the unemployment benefit, either through the increase in the initial
payment or the part-time wage replacement rate, decreases the appeal of part-time
work, most likely because of the effects on reservation wages.
!

The paper is organized as follows. Part II introduces the model, most of which is

adapted from Zuckerman. Part III presents a general solution. Part IV presents a
numerical example. Part V presents some concluding comments.

II. The Model
!

In a given period, an individual is endowed with 1 unit of time that is inelastically

devoted to employment activities. When he is full-time employed, he works the entire
time in that period, the period denoted by n , and when he is unemployed, he expends 1
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searching for a job. Searching in period n incurs a time cost sn . Job offers arrive
randomly in a given period. Fsn (i) denotes the distribution function of the present value
of the lifetime earnings associated with the highest job offer received over the period.

Fsn (i) is stochastically increasing in sn , and for any given sn , the searcher knows the
distribution of Fsn . Additionally, the individual is free to accept a part-time job from a pool
of part-time jobs at any time. These jobs are readily available and all pay a wage of w P
and require a commitment of h P hours per week, both of which are fixed and given
exogenously. This analysis considers all payments net of search costs, which are not
specifically analyzed here. When he is part-time employed, his search time is 1 ! sn
!

The government sets two vectors: U = (u j , N ) and U P = (u jp , N !, r, d) , which are

unemployment compensation for an unemployed individual and unemployment
compensation for an unemployed individual who has taken on a part-time job. U P is
determined as a function of the workerʼs income from part-time work. When the
individual is working part-time, his benefit is u j ! w P h P (1 ! r) , where j = 1, 2 ,
differentiating between the full retained earnings schedule and the partial retained
earnings schedule, respectively. The individual chooses sn , the amount of search he
commits to in period n , T , the point at which he accepts the best current full-time job
offer, when to take on a part-time job, and T P . If he takes on a part-time job, his
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maximum benefit period increases from N to N ! because the worker has a fixed pool
of benefits from which to draw, u j N , with

$&T P + u j (N " T P ) / (u j " w P hnP r + d),!if !d < w P hnP r < u + d
N! = % P
j
P
j
P P
P P
'&T + u (N " T ) / (u " w hn r),!if !w hn r # d

!

Where d is the level of the disregard in the full retained earnings payment

schedule. If, at the end of N ! periods the worker has not accepted a job, he takes on a
default job, with earnings I . Since part-time work is always available, the lower bound
on I is w P h P .
!

This paper seeks to compare the two schemes of unemployment compensation

described in the Introduction. The first is one in which earnings from a part-time job are
disregarded until his income equals d , at which point benefits decrease one-for-one
with earnings. The second scheme is one in which an additional dollar of earnings
decreases benefits by 1 ! r , 0 ! r ! 1 , . Because the total payments over the course of
the spell must be equivalent between the full and partial payment schemes, the
following relation holds between the initial unemployment benefit levels:

u 2 = u1 (u1 + 2d)(1 ! r)
The individualʼs objective function, as suggested by Zuckerman, is given by
f (T ,T P , s, ! | U,U P ) = E[X sn (T ) + Tu j + w P hnP r(T " T P )]P(T # N $ ) + E[I + N $u j + w P hnP r( N $ " T P )]P(T > N $ )!!!(1)

where X sn (T ) is the value of the highest offer received in period n , given search level

sn . This equation represents the expected lifetime earnings of the individual as a
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function of the unemployment benefit and earnings from part-time and full-time
employment.
!

Given that the individual follows the behavior (T ,T P , sn ) 1, the (benevolent)

governmentʼs objective is to select (U = (u, N ),U P = (u P , N !, r, d)) , which maximizes the
individualʼs expected lifetime income (productivity) net of transfers,
g(U,U P | T ,T P , ! , sn ) = E[X sn (T ) + w P hnP r(T " T P )]P(T # N $ ) + E[I + w P hnP r( N $ " T P )]P(T > N $ )!!!!(2)

Where the payments u j do not appear in g because they represent zero sum transfer
payments from the point of view of society 2.
!

As in Zuckerman, the solution of the model involves a Stackelberg (1952)

solution concept, with the government serving as the leader and the worker as the
follower. The government anticipates the workerʼs reaction (T ! ,T P* , s *n ) and therefore
determines an optimal policy maximizing g(U,U P | T ! ,T P* , s *n ) with respect to U and U P .
!

As is common in the literature (Devine 1991), the worker employs a reservation

wage strategy, which is to accept the highest full-time wage in a given period, given that
it is at least as big as his reservation wage. In this model, Zuckerman defines the
reservation wage as the recursive equation

!n "1 = u j + w P h nPr+ !n + Gsn (!n )!!!!(3)

1

As will be shown below, there is only a single spell of part-time work within the unemployment spell.

2

These payments come from taxpayers and are transferred to the unemployed. So from the point of view
of society, any good given to an unemployed worker is taken from an employed worker, and g seeks to
capture the added effect of this transfer. Presumably, these unemployed workers have paid into the
system and are therefore receiving their own money, but this model does not take budget balancing into
account.

7
#

with !N " = I and Gsn (!n ) = $ (y " !n )dFsn (y) , where Gsn is the expected return from sn
!n

time units devoted to search in a period, given reservation wage !n . It is clear that Gsn
is convex, nonnegative, monotonically increasing in !n for any given search effort, and

Gsn (!) = 0 .
Proposition 1 . The reservation wages !n are decreasing over time.
!

Proof. The relation in (3) , combined with the fact that Gsn (!n ) " 0 , establishes the

!

proof of Proposition 1 .

III. General Solution
!

The worker chooses whether or not to work part-time in any given period

according to the following rule illustrated in Figure 2 in the Appendix. The worker
chooses to search full-time until T P , where his Gsn curve, which represents the value of
accepting a full-time job at his reservation wage in period n , falls to the point where it
equals the value of accepting a part-time job, at which point he chooses to work parttime. When he takes on a part-time job, his Gsn curve will then flatten because the
reservation wages increase and the unemployment benefit decreases, leading to an
increase in the number of periods available to receive benefits. This is summarized in
Proposition 2 .
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Proposition 2 . A worker takes on a part-time job at G1 = w P h P r + u j and quits the job at

G1! h P = w P h P .
!

Proof. For w P h P ! G1 ,G1" h P ! w P h P r + u , G1 (!n ) " G1# h P (!n ) , since Gsn is

!

monotonically decreasing.

!

In order to determine what happens when the government changes its policy

from full to partial retained earnings, define D = u 2 + w P h P r ! (u1 + w P h P ) as the additional
income that the worker receives from a partial retained earnings policy. In order to
1

determine the effect of changing r , take u and d as fixed, and recalling that

u 2 = u1 (u1 + 2d)(1 ! r) , we obtain
dD / dr = w P h P ! (u1 (u1 + 2d) / (1 ! r)!!!!!!!(4)
d 2 D / dr 2 = !(1 / 2) u1 (u1 + 2d) / (1 ! r)3 !!!!!(5)

Note that dD / dr > 0 when w P h P > u1 (u1 + 2d) / (1 ! r) and d 2 D / dr 2 < 0 , implying that

D is concave in r . So moving from full to partial retained earnings only increases the
value of part-time work when w P h P < u1 (u1 + 2d) / (1 ! r) . Because of the income cutoff
in the full retained earnings schedule, d + u1 > w P h P > u1 (u1 + 2d) / (1 ! r) .
!

Now consider an increase in the value of part-time work, demonstrated in Figure

3 of the Appendix, either from an increase in u or a decrease in r that increases the
total value, as illustrated above. An increase in w P h P r + u will also increase G , since an
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increase in the benefit increases the reservation wage, shifting both the part-time
income curve and the G curve up, and also because an increase in u necessarily
decreases the number of periods available.
Proposition 3 . An increase in the unemployment benefit u j will increase T P .
!

Proof. It is clear that since dGs!n ("n ) / d"n # dGsn ("n ) / d"n , G ! intersects w P h P r + u j !

!

at a larger value of !n than G intersects w P h P r + u j .

!

Now, knowing the individualʼs reaction curve, the government employs an optimal

policy . In optimizing the governmentʼs objective function, note that while u j does not
directly appear in the function, N is determined by u j , so an optimal u j* and an optimal

N * are complementary. Since sn and ! are determined by T P , the independent
decisions that the individual makes are T (U,U P ),T P (U,U P ) . We then plug these optimal
values back into the governmentʼs objective function.

IV. Numerical Example
!

Suppose u = 20 , d = 10 , w P h P = 20 , r = 1 , and F is uniformly distributed over the

interval (20, 20 + 20s) , so we have

F = 1 / (20s),!!20 ! y ! 20 + 20s
!!!!!!0,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!otherwise

And this gives us
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G1 (x) = (1 / 40)(x 2 ! 80x + 1600)
G1/2 (x) = (1 / 20)(x 2 ! 60x + 900)

We set N = 5 and calculate the reservation wages and values of G1 in each period.
Period
Res Wage
G1

1
294
152

2
118
26

3
72.5
2.5

4
50
10

5
20
--

So we see that in Period 2 , G1 falls below the value of the part-time job, giving us T P .
From here we can calculate N ! = 8 , which allows us to calculate the G1/2 curve from
here, giving us
Period
Res
Wage
G1/2

1
1.7E+28

2
3
1.8E+14 1.93E+08

4
62165

5
1134

6
166

7
65

8
20

1.40E+57

1.6E+29 1.93E+08

61051

924

61

5

--

Note here that N ! = 7 , making total time working part-time ! = 5 .
!

Now increase the benefit to 30 .

Period
Res Wage
G1

1
1060
810

2
220
90

3
100
10

4
60
10

5
20
--

Here, T P = 3 , N ! = 6 . Now compute the part-time reservation wages from N ! .
Period
Res Wage
G1/2

1
2834603718
2.80E+09

2
238120
235662

3
2201
1920

4
226
101

5
75
5

6
20
--

This gives us N ! = 5 , ! = 2 .
!

There are a couple things this example highlights. Note that the values of G are

increased when the individual is working part-time. So we can see that increasing the
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benefit level actually makes part-time work less appealing, which is a surprising result
but makes sense in the context of the effects of the unemployment benefit on the
reservation wages.

V. Conclusions
!

A simple model that adapts Zuckermanʼs search model has been presented with

the introduction of subsidized part-time work. Conditions for the workerʼs optimal fulltime/part-time/unemployment decision have been presented. There are, however, a
number of issues that need mention.
!

This model does not assign a value to leisure. A more complex model could take

into account the tradeoff between consumption and leisure. This would require relaxing
the assumption that the workerʼs time is inelastically set to be for either search or work,
which is not too philosophically difficult to allow. Another area it would be illuminating to
explore is in other shapes of G . This analysis took it to be uniform for mathematical
simplicity, but experimenting with normal distributions or otherwise may introduce other
complexities to the analysis.
!

This analysis takes all unemployment benefits to be transfer payments with a

zero-sum effect on society. An extension of this analysis would view this in a different
light, by either taking past employment into consideration when determining benefit
levels or taking into consideration total social welfare. In either case, considering a
balanced budget would be beneficial for further analysis.
!

More importantly, the result that an increase in the value of part-time work leads

to a reduction in part-time work needs further exploration for being counterintuitive and
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contrary to the literature. McCallʼs (1997) results demonstrated that an increase in the
disregard leads to an initial increase in working part-time, but a decrease over time in
the value of part-time work because of the decreasing reservation wages. Also, while
this paper does explore what happens when the part-time work replacement rate
changes, and suggests that states with partial retained earnings will dissuade
unemployed workers from finding part-time jobs, more work needs to be done in the
future to determine whether or not these systems are any better than full retained
earnings.
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Appendix

Full Retained Earnings

Income

u1 + d

u1

Hours Working
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Partial Retained Earnings

u2

Hours Working

Figure 1. Full retained earnings schedule versus partial retained earnings
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Time Allocation Profile
Income

G ft search

wh+u

G pt search
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Figure 2. When the part-time income curve is greater than the G curve, the worker takes on a part-time job,
resulting in a flatter G curve, where he continues to work until his part-time G curve is equal to I
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Effect of Increase in u
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Figure 3. An increase in u leads to a delay in the acceptance of a part-time job and decreases the maximum length of the eligibility period.
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